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Abstract
In the aftermath of the nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima, German nuclear policy has been reconsidered.
This paper demonstrates the economic eects of an accelerated nuclear phase-out on the German electricity
generation sector. A detailed optimization model for European electricity markets is used to analyze two
scenarios with dierent lifetimes for nuclear plants (phase-out vs. prolongation). Based on political targets,
both scenarios assume signicant electricity demand reductions and a high share of generation from renew-
able energy sources in Germany. Our principal ndings are: First, nuclear capacities are mainly replaced
by longer lifetimes of existing coal-red plants and the construction of new gas-red plants. Second, fossil
fuel-based generation and power imports increase, while power exports are reduced in response to the lower
nuclear generation. Third, despite the increased fossil generation, challenging climate protection goals can
still be achieved within the framework of the considered scenarios. Finally, system costs and electricity
prices are clearly higher. We conclude that the generation sector can generally cope with an accelerated
nuclear phase-out under the given assumptions. Yet, we emphasize that such a policy requires a substantial
and costly transformation of the supply and the demand side.
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In the aftermath of the nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima in March 2011, nuclear policy has been re-
considered in Germany. Only shortly before, in December 2010, the amendment of the German nuclear law
(Atomgesetz, 2010) was passed, including a possible prolongation of nuclear plant lifetimes up to 14 years
compared to the nuclear phase-out decision in 2002 (Atomkonsens, 2002). As an immediate reaction to the
Fukushima catastrophe, the German government decided on a three-month moratorium which included the
temporary shutdown of the seven oldest nuclear power plants and the nuclear plant Kr ummel in order to
re-evaluate the risks of nuclear power and the associated energy policy. Irrespective of a possibly changing
nuclear policy, it was political will that ambitious climate protection targets, as dened in the coalition
agreement between CDU/CSU (conservatives) and FDP (liberals) for the 17th legislative period, should still
be reached. Most importantly this agreement features the target of a 40% (80%) greenhouse gas emissions
reduction until 2020 (2050) compared to 1990 as well as considerable energy eciency improvements and a
signicant expansion of renewable energy sources.
This paper presents an analysis of the eects of an accelerated nuclear phase-out on the electricity sector,
based on a study commissioned by the German Ministry of Economics and Technology during the time of
the nuclear moratorium. We use a detailed investment and dispatch model of European electricity markets
and compute two scenarios in order to investigate the impact of a fast nuclear phase-out on electricity
capacities, generation, import and export streams, electricity prices and costs, and CO2-emissions. Scenario
A re
ects German law before Fukushima, thus possible lifetimes up to the year 2036 for the newest nuclear
plants. Prolongations of lifetimes in scenario A are only possible when signicant retrot investments are
undertaken. In scenario B all nuclear plants that were shutdown during the moratorium are decommissioned
permanently. The remaining nuclear plants have to be shutdown either between 2015 and 2020 (six plants)
or before 2025 (three plants). Thus, scenario B corresponds to the political decision reached after the
moratorium. In both scenarios, climate protection targets as dened in the coalition agreement are reached
{ albeit at slightly higher CO2-prices within the European emissions trading system.
Our analysis extends the ndings of Nagl et al. (2011), showing how dierent possible pathways to a
low-carbon German electricity system in 2050 under consideration of dierent nuclear phase-out times can
be reached. Our analysis shows how these climate protection targets can still be reached under a fast
nuclear phase-out and illuminates the corresponding consequences for the electricity sector, focussing on
the timeframe until 2030. The analysis is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of related
literature. Section 3 describes the applied methodological approach, section 4 explains the most important
2technical and political assumptions. Scenario results are discussed in section 5. Section 6 draws conclusions.
2. Literature overview
A series of studies analyzing the eect of a fast nuclear phase-out have been published after the in-
troduction of the moratorium. These studies can be distinguished by their time horizon (i.e. short term,
long term), the applied analytical approach (i.e. model-based, quantitative, qualitative) and their focus on
dierent aspects of the electricity sector.
Matthes et al. (2011b) analyze security of supply as well as price eects in the aftermath of the mora-
torium screening empirical data on installed power plant capacities, planned installations, potentials of
demand side management and historical time series of electricity and carbon emission prices. They show
that prices for electricity and carbon emissions rose only slightly after the moratorium and that under cer-
tain assumptions security of supply can be guaranteed in a scenario with the last nuclear power plant being
shut-down between 2015 and 2020. In a further paper, Matthes et al. (2011a) investigate electricity imports
and exports in Germany after the moratorium in view of a public debate concerning possible \nuclear power
imports from France". Using empirical data on peak demand, exports and imports and nuclear power plant
utilisation in France as well as an analysis of the merit order in Germany, they conclude that additional
imports to Germany after the moratorium are not caused by a shortage of capacity and do not come from
nuclear power plants in France. Both studies mentioned use empirical data covering a short timeframe in
spring after the introduction of the moratorium { e.g. price eects during winter days are not covered by
the analysis. Also, possible eects of a phase-out in the mid and long term on installed capacity are not
considered.
Kunz et al. (2011) use a dispatch model which was calibrated to represent the network capacities in
Central Europe in order to calculate the dispatch in three scenarios (Status quo, Moratorium, Phase-out)
on a typical winter day. The analysis focuses on the short-term and does not take into account investment
possibilities. The authors observe a rise in imports and a decline in exports combined with a rising electricity
price in Germany in the moratorium and phase-out scenarios.
The German regulatory authority Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA, 2011) focuses on network capacity as-
pects of security of supply. Several scenarios have been analyzed (using dierent analytical approaches)
based on dierent assumptions concerning electricity generation from renewable energy sources (RES-E)
and electricity demand. The analysis shows that a capacity problem may occur on winter days with little
wind. The authors thus advocate network capacity extensions in order to cope with regional dierences in
3demand and generation aggravated by a phase-out from nuclear power.
r2b (2011) apply a model based analysis, covering the timeframe from 2012 to 2020, to calculate a
status quo scenario (based on German law before Fukushima) and a phase-out scenario (all nuclear power
plants have to be shut-down until 2017). Based on several assumptions concerning RES-E share, fuel prices
and electricity demand they observe a decline in net exports and a signicant rise in carbon emission and
electricity prices in case of a nuclear phase-out. The qualitative eects of this study are in line with the
other studies mentioned here, but the magnitude of the price eects is strikingly dierent (i.e. much more
pronounced).
Prognos (2011) analyse two scenario groups covering several moratorium and phase-out scenarios (varying
in their shutdown schedule). In this analysis, which covers the timeframe until 2025, imports and exports
are treated exogenously. The authors see a rise in electricity production from fossil driven power plants, in
particular hard coal until 2020, as well as an increase in prices. They conclude that a phase-out is possible,
but stress that investment stimulating incentives have to be investigated.
As we show in the following sections, the results of our analysis are generally in line with the above-
mentioned studies, in particular concerning the eects on imports and exports and the rising electricity and
CO2 prices. However, we do observe a dierent magnitude of the eects which results from dierences in
methodology and focus. Contrary to (a part of) the before-mentioned studies we model both dispatch and
investment decisions, thus including short term eects and long term eects until 2030. In addition, within
the nuclear prolongation scenario, we allow for endogenous (cost minimizing) prolongation decisions of each
nuclear power plant in Germany based on plant specic retrot costs. The quantity of nuclear capacity in
our scenario representing German law before Fukushima thus varies from other studies, since not all possible
nuclear lifetime extensions are realized in an overall cost-minimizing approach, due to high retrot costs
(see section 5). Moreover, by a combined analysis of all carbon emitting sectors our analysis shows that the
ambitious carbon emission reduction targets as dened in the coalition agreement for the 17th legislative
period are reached in both scenarios.1 Our analysis therefore describes a possible pathway to a low-carbon
electricity system in Germany under an accelerated nuclear phase-out.
3. Methodical approach
Political intervention in electricity markets, like the one we analyze in this paper, may cause eects (e.g.
increasing prices) that in
uence several sectors of an economy and may eventually feedback on electricity
1For more details on this aspect see Schlesinger et al. (2011).
4markets (e.g. price elastic electricity demand). An analysis of the economic eects of an accelerated nuclear
phase-out therefore requires a simultaneous analysis of all relevant sectors. Reasons are (short and long-
term) price responsiveness of electricity consumers, diering CO2-abatement costs between the sectors as
well as the ecient allocation of scarce input factors, such as biomass, between the sectors.2
In our study, simulation models were used to analyze the eects in the specic sectors (Schlesinger et al.
(2010) and Distekamp et al. (2004)). For the computations of the electricity and cogeneration system, a
long-term investment and dispatch model for the European electricity and combined heat markets (DIME) is
used.3 DIME is a dynamic optimization model that calculates the cost-minimal solution to meet electricity
demand in Europe. It is applied to simulate an hourly dispatch of conventional power plants leading to
investment decisions regarding the supply side of the electricity sector. The objective function minimizes
total discounted system costs.
Input parameters can be divided into three groups: demand side parameters, supply side parameters
and political parameters. The demand met by conventional generation is called residual demand, which
essentially is given by total demand minus RES-E generation.4
Important input parameters for the supply side include the costs of generation (investment costs, op-
eration and maintenance costs, fuel prices), technical parameters of conventional generation technologies
(including minimum load, net eciency and ramp-up times) and the amount of conventional capacities
already existing within a country. Cross-country electricity transmission is constrained by net transfer ca-
pacities (NTC) as exogenous model parameters. Political input parameters include decisions on nuclear
policy or the dierent RES-E regimes in the European countries.
The timeframe of the model is from 2008 to 2030 in ve-year steps. (The optimization extends until
2070 in order to derive consistent investment decisions after 2020.) The dispatch in each year is represented
by three typical days per season considering load and renewable generation { each day consists of 24 hours.
Important model outputs are electricity generation by technology and fuel, investment in power plants and
long-run marginal costs of electricity generation.5
The interdependencies between the electricity sector and the rest of the economy are taken into account
using an iterative approach. In order to nd a consistent solution for the electricity and cogeneration system,
variables are iterated between the models to estimate sectoral electricity demands (Schlesinger et al., 2010)
and the DIME model. In DIME the demand for electricity and (cogenerated) heat are used as input
2For example, the transportation sector highly depends on liquid biomass if climate goals are to be achieved.
3See Bartels (2009), for applications see e.g. Paulus and Borggrefe (2010) or Nagl et al. (2011).
4Electricity generation from waste and small-scale CHP technologies are also treated exogenously.
5Marginal costs of electricity generation are estimated on the basis of the dual variables of the equilibrium conditions.
5parameters. DIME results including district and process heat generation, the German import and export
balance of electricity, and electricity prices are in turn used to model sectoral demand developments. This
approach accounts for the interdependency between electricity prices and demand.
4. Assumptions for the electricity sector
The analysis focuses on dierent nuclear phase-out policies in Germany. Through the comparison of two
scenarios, we analyze the eects of an accelerated nuclear phase-out (scenario B) versus a prolongation of
lifetimes for nuclear plants according to German law before the Fukushima catastrophe (scenario A).6 In
scenario B all seven nuclear power plants commissioned before 1980 and the Kr ummel plant are immediately
mothballed. Six other nuclear plants have to be decommissioned between 2015 and 2020. The remaining
three plants will have to be decommissioned before 2025.
Contrary, scenario A assumes, that lifetimes of plants commissioned before 1980, may be prolonged by
eight years and the lifetimes of the remaining plants may be prolonged by additional 14 years.7 This implies
possible lifetimes up to 2036 for some plants.
Signicant retrot investments are obligatory for nuclear power plants if the lifetime is to be extended.
These retrot investment costs are specic to each power plant and vary between the two scenarios. Retrot
investment costs may hamper the protability of certain plants and may hence lead to premature decom-
missions for economic reasons.
In more general terms, both scenarios are embedded in the energy policy framework as dened in the
coalition agreement (between CDU, CSU and FDP) for the 17th legislative period. Most importantly this
agreement features the target of a 40% greenhouse gas emissions reduction until 2020 in comparison to
the emissions in 1990. The agreement furthermore emphasises the need of energy eciency improvements
and states that renewable energies should be expanded continuously in order to play the predominant role
in the future energy mix. Regarding conventional power plants, the usage of carbon capture and storage
technologies is encouraged.
4.1. Electricity demand and potential for cogeneration
It is assumed that substantial energy eciency improvements take place in Germany, leading to a de-
creasing gross electricity demand in the period regarded. The increasing electricity consumption due to the
gradual diusion of electric mobility is overcompensated by substantial energy eciency investments of both
6See Atomkonsens (2002).
7The prolongation times refer to applicable law (Atomkonsens, 2002) before the 2010 amendment to the Atomgesetz (Atom-
gesetz, 2010).
6households and industries. European (net) electricity demand is assumed to further increase in the short
run and to reach a peak in 2020 (4% increase compared to 2008). After 2020 European (net) electricity
demand is assumed to decrease (2% increase compared to 2008).
Table 1: Net (gross) electricity demand and cogeneration potential in Germany in TWh
2008 2015 2020 2025 2030
Electricity demand in TWhel
Scenario A 523.8 (614) 492.7 (574.5) 477.6 (551.4) 468.5 (537.9) 458.7 (516.4)
Scenario B 523.8 (614) 490.8 (571.8) 473.9 (547.7) 465.3 (534.1) 455.5 (514.9)
Heat potential of cogeneration in TWhth
Scenario A 332.7 320.5 309.5 295.6 281.9
Scenario B 332.7 320.5 309.5 295.6 281.9
German gross electricity demand is reduced by about 16% while net electricity demand is reduced by
about 13% until 2030 compared to 2008 (Table 1).8 The increasing share of RES-E in electricity generation
reduces internal power consumption in the system. Furthermore, reduced domestic coal extraction lowers
power losses in other conversion sectors. Consequently, gross electricity demand decreases more than net
electricity demand. Both, the demand for district heating and process heat in industries decrease in the
scenarios. Table 1 reports heating demand (process heat and district heating) which can be served either by
combined heat and power (CHP) or pure heating plants. Again, the assumed energy eciency improvements
reduce heat demand in all sectors.
4.2. Fuel and CO2-allowance prices
Fuel prices for power plants and CO2 prices are based on international market prices and in the case of
fuel prices, transportation costs to the power plants are included. The price path assumed for fuel and CO2
is shown in Table 2. Prices for hard coal and natural gas are assumed to decrease in the mid term but to
increase in the long run up to 3.0 e2008/GJ and 7.2 e2008/GJ, respectively. For domestic lignite we assume
a constant price of 0.4 e2008/GJ. The average price for biomass is assumed to increase up to 13.9 e2008/GJ
in 2030.
Total CO2 emissions are driven by various factors such as RES-E feed-in, utilization of nuclear power,
electricity demand and fossil fuel generation mix. Applied to our scenario framework, with RES-E feed-in
held constant between the scenarios, CO2 emissions vary between the scenarios because of dierent utilization
rates of power plants and dierent assumptions concerning electricity demand. Because of the accelerated
8The development of electricity demand was modelled by Prognos AG using a bottom-up approach as described in Schlesinger
et al. (2010).
7shutdown of nuclear power plants in scenario B, total CO2 emissions in scenario B are higher than in scenario
A. This consequently leads to slightly higher CO2 prices in the European ETS market (Table 2).
Table 2: Fuel costs in e2008/GJ and CO2 prices in e2008/t CO2
2008 2015 2020 2025 2030
Coal 4.8 3.0 2.8 3.0 3.0
Lignite 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Natural gas 7.0 5.6 6.4 6.8 7.2
Biomass 8.3 10.6 11.9 13.1 13.9
CO2 price (scenario A) 22.0 17.5 22.5 30.1 39.5
CO2 price (scenario B) 22.0 18.7 23.9 32.2 41.3
4.3. Technical and economic parameters for power plants
Table 3 depicts the retrot costs for nuclear power plants based on data provided by the Federal Ministry
for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU). Due to the longer lifetime of nuclear
power plants, retrot costs are higher in scenario A.
Table 3: Retrot costs for nuclear power plants for scenario A and B in e2008/kW
Scenario A Scenario B
Biblis A 600 -
Neckarwestheim 1 600 -
Biblis B 600 -
Brunsb uttel 600 -
Isar 1 600 -
Unterweser 600 -
Philippsburg 1 600 -
Grafenrheinfeld 1,200 100
Kr ummel 1,700 -
Philippsburg 2 1,600 600
Grohnde 1,600 600
Gundremmingen B 1,300 100
Gundremmingen C 1,400 600
Brokdorf 1,700 600
Isar 2 1,800 600
Neckarwestheim 2 2000 1,200
Emsland 1,800 600
Investment costs for conventional and renewable technologies are shown in Table 4. Several new or
improved conventional technologies are assumed in this study: Coal "innovative" - 4% higher net eciency
as state of the art power plants; lignite "innovative" - novel drying process leads to a net eciency of
48%; and CCS-technologies - available from 2025 with lower net eciencies than technologies without CCS.
Investment costs for renewable technologies, especially wind and solar are assumed to decrease due to
learning curve eects until 2030.
8Table 4: Development of investment costs for thermal power plants and renewables in e2008/kW
2015 2020 2025 2030
Lignite 1,850 1,850 1,850 1,850
Lignite (innovative) 1,950 1,950 1,950 1,950
Coal 1,300 1,300 1,300 1,300
Coal (innovative) 2,375 2,250 2,025 1,875
CCGT 950 950 950 950
OCGT 400 400 400 400
IGCC-CCS - - 2,363 2,039
CCGT-CCS - - 1,212 1,173
Coal-CCS - - 1,856 1,848
Coal-CCS (innovative) - - 2,806 2,423
Lignite-CCS - - 2,506 2,498
Wind onshore 1,080 1,030 1,005 985
Wind oshore 2,850 2,400 1,925 1,670
Photovoltaics 2,000 1,375 1,160 1,085
Geothermal 13,500 10,750 10,000 9,500
Biomass 2,400 2,300 2,250 2,200
Hydro 3,500 3,850 4,025 4,128
4.4. Development of RES-E in power generation
Due to the implemented feed-in-tari system, RES-E capacities have been increased signicantly in
Germany in recent years. Since the introduction of the promotion system in 2000, the RES-E share of
gross electricity consumption has increased from 6.4% to 16.8% in 2010. The development is mainly based
on onshore wind turbines, additional biomass plants and especially in the last two years photovoltaics.
The further development highly depends on the design of the feed-in tari system, technological innovation
and the technical and economic potential. Table 5 shows the assumed RES-E capacities and the assumed
generation by RES-E capacities until 2030.
Table 5: Development of RES-E generation in TWh and (in parentheses) RES-E capacities in GW
2008 2015 2020 2025 2030
Hydro 20.3 (5.2) 19.0 (5.2) 20.0 (5.2) 24.0 (5.4) 24.0 (5.4)
Wind onshore 40.4 (23.9) 63.9 (33.6) 69.4 (34.0) 75.8 (35.8) 77.4 (35.8)
Wind oshore 0.0 (0.0) 9.1 (3.0) 32.0 (9.4) 44.4 (12.0) 63.5 (16.7)
Photovoltaics 4.4 (6.0) 26.2 (29.1) 32.0 (33.3) 36.0 (37.5) 41.4 (43.1)
Biomass & Waste 27.2 (5.4) 42.1 (7.8) 44.4 (8.2) 49.4 (9.0) 49.5 (9.0)
Geothermal 0.0 (0.0) 0.4 (0.1) 0.9 (0.1) 1.7 (0.2) 2.0 (0.3)
Total 92.3 (40.5) 160.7 (78.8) 198.7 (90.2) 231.3 (99.9) 257.7 (110.3)
The strong increase of total generation by RES-E capacities (258 TWh in 2030) is mainly driven by
additional wind turbines (on- and oshore), photovoltaics and biomass plants. Due to the limited potential
of hydro plants in Germany only a small increase in generation is assumed.
95. Scenario results
5.1. Power plant 
eet
Due to the mothballing of the seven oldest nuclear power plants and Kr ummel (together 8.7 GW) in
scenario B, total installed nuclear capacity in Germany is reduced to 12.7 GW in 2015 (Figure 1). Further
decommissioning of nuclear power plants between 2015 and 2020 reduce installed nuclear capacity to 4.3
GW in 2020. Those remaining plants are mothballed before 2025.
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In contrast, 19 GW of nuclear capacity are still installed in 2015 and 16.4 GW in 2020 in scenario A. The
dierence of 6.4 GW of nuclear capacity between the two scenarios in 2015 is less than the maximum possible
dierence of 8.7 GW. This is due to the higher retrot costs for nuclear power plants in scenario A, thus
making the prolongation of 2.3 GW unprotable. The dierence in installed nuclear capacity increases over
time between the scenarios. In 2020 a dierence of 12.1 GW occurs while in 2025 the maximum dierence
of 14.1 GW is reached. Nuclear power plants are gradually mothballed in scenario A with the last power
plants going oine between 2035 and 2040.
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The decommissioning of nuclear plants causes an additional need for conventional generation capacity in
the German electricity market which is satised in a cost-minimal way (Figure 2). Firstly, economic lifetimes
of 5.4 GW of old coal-red plants are extended in scenario B. Secondly, in addition to the power plants
currently under construction, signicant new-built gas-red generation capacities come online (Figure 3).
The investment dynamics vary between the two scenarios: Due to the additional need for capacity between
2015 und 2025 in scenario B, caused by the fast nuclear phase-out, commissioning of other power plants is
accelerated. This mainly aects (open cycle) gas turbines which have relatively short lead times. Yet, under
the assumption of a decreasing electricity demand in Germany, total conventional capacity is also decreasing
while renewable capacity is increasing over time. Additional RES-E capacity mainly comprises wind power
onshore (+11.9 GW until 2030), oshore (+16.7 GW) and photovoltaics (+37.1 GW). Apart from plants
currently under construction (+11.5 GW fossil-red plants, among them 8.7 GW hard coal-based), no
additional hard coal or lignite-red capacities without CCS technology are installed in the scenarios.
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5.2. Gross electricity and CHP-heat generation
Nuclear power generation in scenario B is in 2015 46.4 TWh lower and in 2020 89.4 TWh lower than
in scenario A as a consequence of the fast phase-out (Figure 4). The maximum dierence in nuclear power
generation occurs in 2025 between the two scenarios. In this year all nuclear plants are decommissioned
in scenario B while the remaining nuclear plants generate 102.4 TWh of electricity in scenario A. Nuclear
power generation decreases to 89.7 TWh in scenario A in 2030 due to the mothballing of some older plants.












Nuclear Hard coal Hard coal CCS Lignite Lignite CCS Natural gas
Fuel oil Pumped storage other Hydro Wind onshore Wind offshore
Biomass Photovoltaics Geothermal other RES-E Net imports
2008                      2015                                2020                               2025                     2030            
The reduced nuclear power generation in scenario B compared to scenario A is mainly compensated by
three eects (Figure 5). Firstly, generation from existing fossil-fuel red power stations increases. This
eect is highlighted by the increased generation from hard coal-red plants in scenario B compared to
scenario A (2015: +25.6 TWh; 2020: +22.8 TWh; 2025: +19.9 TWh; 2030: +4.9 TWh). Secondly, as
a consequence of the decommissioning of nuclear plants, additional conventional capacity is installed and
utilised. This eect mainly occurs after 2020. In this period additional gas-red capacities come online
and are utilised as long as the clean spark spread (gross prot margin of gas-red generation taking into
account CO2 costs) is favourable for these plants. Finally, European power trade is in
uenced. In 2015
Germany is a net electricity exporter in both scenarios. In contrast, Germany becomes a net importer in
2020 due to the fast nuclear phase-out while Germany remains a net exporter in scenario A. In the long run,
Germany becomes a net importer of electricity in both scenarios, yet, net imports are higher in scenario
B. These eects are a consequence of higher generation from coal and gas-red plants in Germany due
to the fast phase-out which raises marginal costs of generation and hence increases imports and decreases
exports. Generally, the direction of international power 
ows is in
uenced by the fact that (by assumption)
electricity demand is increasing in the rest of Europe while German electricity demand is decreasing. This
13development is paralleled by an expansion on the supply side. While there are signicant fossil generation
capacities currently under construction and coming online within the next few years (see Figure 3 above),
the increase on the supply side is mainly due to RES-E capacity development which receives strong political
support.




















































Specically, net imports are 9.9 TWh higher under a fast nuclear phase-out policy in 2015 (Table 6). This
is mainly caused by a reduction of power exports from Germany to the Netherlands, Poland and Switzerland
while imports increase by 2.7 TWh. In 2020 net imports are 26.3 TWh higher in scenario B. Most of the
additional imports are provided by French and Czech generators. In the long run dierences in net imports
(2025: 20.6 TWh; 2030: 24.2 TWh) are mainly caused by additional imports coming from Poland and the
Netherlands.
Table 6: Dierences in exports, imports and net imports between scenario B (nuclear phase-out) and A (prolongation), in TWh
2015 2020 2025 2030
Imports 2.7 5.0 11.3 11.0
Exports -7.2 -21.3 -9.3 -13.3
Net imports 9.9 26.3 20.6 24.2
The share of combined heat and power (CHP) generation increases in both scenarios. However, CHP-
heat generation is higher under a fast nuclear phase-out regime in comparison to a prolongation policy.
This is due to the commissioning of gas-red power plants with CHP-technology in response to capacity
needs caused by the fast phase-out. These plants are utilised to compensate for the reduced nuclear power
generation in scenario B and thus are able to eciently serve heat demand in industry and district heating.
145.3. Costs of electricity generation and electricity prices
Comparison of scenario B (nuclear phase-out) to A (prolongation) shows that overall generation cost
is increased by the phase-out.9,10 Accumulating the additional generation costs of scenario B relative to
scenario A until 2030, gives a sum of about 16.4 bn e2008. The present value of these costs using a discount
rate of 3% (10%) amounts to 10.5 bn e2008 (4 bn e2008).
Taking a more detailed look at the dierent cost categories, we nd that they follow opposing trends, as
shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6: Accumulated generation cost dierences dierentiated by cost categories between scenario B (nuclear phase-out) and







































































On the one hand, we identify reductions in investment costs as well as in xed operating and maintenance
(O&M) costs in scenario B relative to scenario A. These reductions re
ect avoided retrotting and O&M
costs associated with the nuclear power plants, which have been shut down in scenario B. Note that the
avoided retrotting costs for nuclear power plants in scenario B outweigh additional investment costs arising
from (additional) capacity commissioning, hence resulting in lower investment costs in scenario B than in
scenario A. Adding up the aforementioned cost reductions until 2030, gives an amount of 16.8 bn e2008.
On the other hand, as a result of the nuclear phase-out in Germany we nd an increase in variable
generation costs including the costs associated with the cross-border electricity exchange (costs of additional
electricity imports and foregone revenues of exports). This may be explained by the fact that nuclear power
9The additional generation costs considered in this section, correspond to the extra costs of conventional electricity genera-
tion. This is due to the fact that the costs of RES are assumed to be the same in both scenarios.
10There remain risks with every technology - even when adhering to all mandatory security standards -, which in general
need to be treated as external costs. As of now, there has not been reached a consensus regarding the correct methodology to
quantify those external costs. Therefore, these costs are not taken into consideration in this paper. See the research projects
NEEDS (www.needs-project.org) and EXTERN-E of the European Commission (www.externe.info) for a discussion about
external costs.
15plants, which were decommissioned because of the moratorium, had to be replaced by generation capacities
with higher variable costs, like gas- or coal-fueled power plants. Furthermore, this substitution leads to
additional CO2-emissions in Germany, which in turn causes a rise of the CO2-price, thus increasing the
variable costs of all fossil-fueled power plants. Overall, generation cost increasing eects (about 43.2 bn
e2008) exceed cost reductions, thus leading to additional generation costs in scenario B which amount to
16.4 bn e2008 until 2030.
The phase-out of nuclear power plants leads to higher electricity prices for end-consumers. The impact
depends on the consumer type. Table 7 shows the wholesale price, additional costs for renewable energies
due to the feed-in tari system and the resulting end-consumer prices including taxes and grid taris.
Table 7: Electricity prices in scenario A (prolongation) and B (nuclear phase-out), in e2008/MWh
Scenario A Scenario B
2008 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Wholesale prices 65 39 40 45 46 43 47 54 55
Additional costs for RES-E 12 34 40 38 34 33 37 34 30
End consumer prices
Households 217 212 221 227 225 216 226 232 230
Trade and commerce 127 143 151 155 154 146 155 160 158
Industries 96 99 107 111 110 102 111 116 114
Electricity intensive industry 71 45 46 52 54 49 53 61 63
Due to higher fuel and CO2 costs, the wholesale electricity prices increase in both scenarios until 2030.
In the short and medium term (until 2030), the decreasing electricity demand, the development of RES-E
capacities and the existing and currently-under-construction power plants lead to a comfortable capacity
situation in Germany. This leads to a lower wholesale electricity price compared to 2010. In the long run,
the wholesale electricity price covers the full costs of conventional power plants but not the costs of RES-E
capacities.
The additional costs of RES-E are calculated by extrapolation of the current procedure of sharing these
costs. Hence, the additional costs of RES-E sensitively depend on the development of the wholesale electricity
price. Due to the strong RES-E expansion with generation costs that exceed wholesale prices, the additional
costs increase until 2020. After 2020 the assumed investment costs of RES-E are signicantly lower than
today and the additional costs for RES-E decrease. The dierences in additional costs for RES-E capacities
between scenario A and B are due to the dierent wholesale prices.
The dierences of electricity prices for end-consumers between years and scenarios mainly result from the
dierences in wholesale prices and additional RES-E costs. End-consumer prices increase until 2025/2030.
16The electricity price for the electricity intensive industry highly depends on the wholesale electricity price
because of exceptional rules considering taxes and additional RES-E costs. The faster phase-out of nuclear
power in scenario A leads to a higher electricity price for the energy intensive industry. For the other
consumer groups the lower wholesale prices are partly compensated by the burden of the additional costs
for RES-E. Therefore the dierences between the scenarios are considerably smaller. The burden of a faster
phase-out of nuclear power for end-consumers can be determined by the additional expenses for electricity,
i.e. the dierence in electricity prices weighted by the electricity consumption.
Figure 7: Dierence of accumulated nancial burden for end-consumers between scenario B (nuclear phase-out) and A (pro-
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Figure 7 shows the accumulated nancial burden for the dierent end-consumer groups in bn e2008
until 2030. Due to higher electricity prices, the faster phase-out of nuclear power leads to an additional
accumulated nancial burden for all end-consumers of about 32 bn e2008 until 2030 (not discounted). The
net present value amounts to 27.8 bn e2008 (3% discount rate) or 11.4 bn e2008 (10% discount rate).
6. Concluding remarks
This paper presented a model-based analysis of two nuclear phase-out energy policy scenarios and their
implications for the German electricity market. The analysis shows that the electricity generation sec-
tor can cope with an accelerated phase-out. New-built gas-red capacities, lifetime extensions of existing
installations and an increasing share of RES-E substitute the mothballed nuclear plants. Electricity im-
ports increase and exports decrease while domestic generation from fossil-fuelled plants increases during the
analysed period in the accelerated phase-out scenario.
17Clearly, the analysis shows that an accelerated nuclear phase-out increases both costs and prices of
electricity in Germany. Yet, additional costs in the power system are dampened in the case of an accelerated
phase-out due to the avoidance of high retrot costs in the prolongation scenario. Although prices increase
for all consumer groups, price increases are more pronounced for industrial consumers than for households.
Increasing wholesale electricity prices decrease additional costs for RES-E support and thus partially absorb
the price eect for non-industrial consumers.11
However, the magnitude of the eects presented in this paper is driven by two very challenging political
assumptions: Firstly, the realisation of a 36% RES-E share in 2020. Secondly, energy eciency improvements
and hence substantial electricity demand reductions.
Failure in either of the two will result in additional need for investments in conventional power plants
in Germany, additional electricity imports (lower exports) and a higher utilisation rate of high-cost power
plants. Generally, these drivers may increase prices, costs and greenhouse gas emissions in a given system.
Therefore, to organise the nuclear phase-out both economically and environmentally justiable, structural
transformations on the demand and the supply side are crucial.
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